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LESSORS' CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 77 OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT
IN TIMES of economic depression when traffic revenues decline sharply,1
railroads have found it necessary to reduce fixed charges which typically
absorb an abnormally large share of income. 2 Burdensome leases often consti-
tute a large part of such charges ;3 and although a desire to abrogate them has
not been the chief reason for reorganization, 4 it has by no means been an
unimportant factor.5 In reorganizations accomplished through equity receiv-
erships, the lessor whose lease had been rejected was in an unenviable situa-
tion. In view of the strict adherence to the historical concept of rent as issu-
ing from the land and as not due until the period for which it was reserved
had passed, the lessors were generally permitted to prove claims only for dam-
ages actually suffered up to the end of the period for the filing of claims.0
This disinclination to depart from the precepts of ancient English property
law, which was evinced by the majority of jurisdictions,7 had the further
result of precluding any resort to the doctrine of anticipatory breach generally
accepted in the case of the ordinary executory contract involving personalty.8
1. See Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission (1935) 4, 113, 154-55;
Rodgers & Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corporations under Section 77 of the
Bankruptcy Act (1933) 33 CoL. L. Rxv. 571.
2. See CLARK, ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS (1923) 258.
3. The classic example is the lease of the Wisconsin Central to the Northern Pa-
cific, which had much to do with the latter's collapse in 1893. See CLEVELAND & PowELL,
RALROAD FINANCE (1912) 217, 218; RIPLEY, RAILROAD FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION
(1927) 394.
4. See RimPLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 378.
5. Ibid, at 394.
6. Gardiner v. William S. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603 (1918) ; Rogers v. United
Grape Products, 2 F. Supp. 70 (W. D. N. Y. 1933); Wake Development Co. v. Auburn-
Fuller Co., 71 F. (2d) 702 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934); see 2 GERDES, CoRPORATE REORGANIZA-
TIONS (1936) §§ 687, 688; Clark, Foley and Shaw, Adoption and Rejection of Leases by
Receivers (1933) 46 HARV. L. Rrv. 1111, 1119; Douglas and Frank, Landlords' Claims
in Reorganizations (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1003, 1006.
In bankruptcy, the rule was even more strict, for any claim not in existence at the
time of the filing of the petition was barred. Manhattan Properties v. Irving Trust Co.,
291 U. S. 320 (1934) ; Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U. S. 224 (1930). See generally
Fallon, Lessors as Creditors in Bankruptcy (1934) 4 BRooLYN L. Rav. 11; Keegan,
Rights of Landlord and His Bankrupt Tenant (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 379; Littell, Prova-
bility of Claims for Future Rent or Damages (1932) 7 WASH. L. Ray. 307; Schwabacher
and Weinstein, Rent Claims in Bankruptcy (1933) 33 COL. L. Rav. 213.
7. Leo v. Pearce Stores Co., 54 F. (2d) 92 (E. D. Mich. 1931); Grayson v. Mixon,
176 Ark. 1123, 5 S. W. (2d) 312 (1928); Curran v. Smith-Zollinger Co., 157 Atl. 432
(Del. 1931) ; Chemical Bank v. Deposit Co., 156 Ill. 522, 41 N. E. 225 (1895) ; Wilson
v. National Refining Co., 126 Kan. 139, 266 Pac. 941 (1928); Womble v. Leigh, 195
N. C. 282, 142 S. E. 17 (1928); In re Reading Iron Works, 150 Pa. 369, 24 Atl. 617
(1892).
8. See cases cited supra note 6; 2 GERDES, COrcPORATE REORGANIZATIONS (1936)
§§682-684; Clark, Foley, and Shaw, supra note 6, at 1118; Douglas and Frank, supra
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Moreover, under the common law rule in force in many states, re-entry by
the lessor at once terminated the lessee's liability for subsequently accruing
rent,9 so that any further rights of the former were of necessity predicated
upon whatever covenants of indemnity the lease might contain. These fac-
tors were responsible for the development of various types of covenants deal-
ing with indemnity and liquidated damages.20 But few covenants were success-
ful in enlarging the field of provability," and the lessor's attempt to prove a
claim for future rent under a broken lease was doomed to failure in the great
majority of cases.
To remedy many of the abuses inherent in railroad reorganization under
equity receivership procedure, Section 77 %as enacted in 193312 and com-
prehensively amended in 1935.13 The amended act affects lessors' rights in
two important particulars. First, the definition of the term "creditor" includes
the holder of a claim under an unexpired lease; and second, in the event of
the rejection of such a lease the amount of the claim is to be determined "in
accordance with principles obtaining in equity proceedings." 14 A recent de-
cision in the New Haven reorganization is the first to undertake the inter-
pretation of these statutory provisions.'5
The plaintiff had leased its trolley properties in 1906 to the New York,
New Haven and Hartford Railroad Co. for a term of 999 years at a stipu-
lated rental. In 1935, the New Haven filed a petition for reorganization under
Section 77 and its trustees subsequently rejected tile lease. The lessor com-
pany filed a claim for damages. computed as the difference between the re-
note 6. at 1006. The same rule applied in bankruptcy. Central Trust Co. v. Chicago
Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U. S. 581 (1916).
9. See McCormick, Rights of the Landlord itpon Abandonincnt of the Prcinises by
the Tenant (1925) 23 MicH. L. REv. 211; Schnebly, Opcralk'c Facts in Surrerrcrs
(1927) 22 ILT.L. .Ev. 117.
10. See 2 GERDaS, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS §§ 6S5-687; Clark, Foley and Shaw,
supra note 6, at 1120-1122.
11. Manhattan Properties v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320 (1934) ; In re Shaffer,
124 Fed. 111 (D. C. Mass. 1903); In re Cushman, 3 F. (2d) 449 (S. D. N. Y. 1924);
In re Van Fleet, 4 F. Supp. 332 (V. D. Pa. 1933) ; Cotting v. Harper, Lewis & Co., 220
Mass. 273, 107 N. E. 931 (1915); 884 West End Ave. Corp. v. Pearlman, 234 X. Y.
589. 138 N. E. 458 (1922). Contra: Wm. Filene's Suns Co. v. Wed. 245 U. S. 597
(1918); Gardiner v. William S. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603 (1918); Irving Trust Co.
v. Perry, 293 U. S. 307 (1934).
12. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933).
13. 49 STAT. 911 (1935), as amended 49 STAT. 1969, 11 U. S. C. § 205 (Supp. 1936).
14. 49 STAT. 914 (1935), 11 U. S. C. § 205 (to) (Supp. 1936). The statute reads:
"In case an executory contract or unexpired lease vf property shall be rtjlected. or shall
not have been adopted by a trustee . . . any pierson injured by such n,,n-ad-pti,,n or
rejection shall . . . be deemed to be a creditor of the debtor to the extent of the actual
damage or injury determined in accordance with principles obtaining in equity pro-
ceedings.'
15. Matter of New York, N. H. & H. R. R.: Claims of Connecticut Ry. & Light-
ing Co., U. S. Dist. Ct. Conn., Sept. 1, 1937.
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served rental discounted to present value and the use value of the property
for the period of the lease. The court, one year after the period for filing
claims had elapsed, refused this request but granted damages to the date of
the hearing. In arriving at this conclusion, the court confessed its inability
to find any clue to the Congressional intent behind the direction to determine
the extent of the claim in "accordance with principles obtaining in equity
proceedings," since questions relating to damages are not peculiarly within
the field of equity and since there seemed to be no body of precedents to which
the words could refer. However, arguing by analogy to the corresponding
passages in Sections 6316 and 77B17 which impose limitations of one and three
years respectively on the amount of future ient provable, the court inferred
that some limitation was intended. It accordingly construed the words "actual
damage" in the statute' 8 to mean "accrued damage," thus precluding any pos-
sibility of proving claims for future rent. The granting of damages computed
to the date of the hearing was justified on the ground that since the statute
rigidly precluded future damages, equitable treatment necessitated the consid-
eration of all claims which did not fall within the statute's bar.
But there are several factors indicating that the words "actual damage"
were not intended to be given so narrow a meaning. In the first place, the
fact that categorical limitations upon future rent claims were included in
Sections 63 and 77B, and not in Section 77, "s as indicative of an intent to
allow claims in full as of an intent to place some limitation upon them. Fur-
thermore, although none of the preliminary drafts contained specific state-
ments that future rent claims were to be allowed in full, they contained def-
inite indications that this was the intent of the sponsors. By providing that
an assignment of future rent claims shall be considered in determining the
amount of damages allowed, the original draft of the bill seems to indicate
that unassigned claims were to be provable in full.' 9 Although this reference
to future rent claims was omitted from the committee print of the bill, the
latter contained language well calculated to admit of the allowance of claims
in full, for the amount of the claim was to be "the extent of the damage or
injury. '" 20 To these words the final draft added the word "actual" and the
16. 48 STAT. 924, 11 U. S. C. § 103 (a) (7) (1934).
17. 48 STAT. 915, 11 U. S. C. § 207 (b) (1934).
18. 49 STAT. 914 (1935), 11 U. S. C. § 205(b) (Supp. 1936). See note 14, supra.
19. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, H. R. Doc. No. 89,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 231. The draft read: ". . . any person injured . . .
shall . . . be deemed to be a creditor to the extent of such damage or injury, pro-
vided that the judge shall consider the circumstances of an assignment of future rent
claims . . . in determining the amount of damages allowed an assignee ... "
20. Hearings before the Committee of the Jidiciary on H. R. 6249, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1935) 3. Deletion of the reference to the assignment of future rent claims un-
doubtedly indicates a realization that that is a problem peculiar to ordinary corporate
reorganization rather than any intent to limit the provability of claims. See note 44,
infra.
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phrase "determined in accordance with principles obtaining in equity pro-
ceedings;" but neither in the testimony before the Judiciary Committee,2
nor in the reports of the bill to Congress, " nor in the discussion on the floor'
is there any indication why the addition was made. If, as seems likely, these
words were added because of a desire to leave the final dtermination to the
courts,24 the seemingly innocuous phra:-e has served its purpou:e, and no deci-
sion will be final until the Supreme Court has spo!cen.
The lessor's partial victory in the instant case appears to constitute a
compromise between, rather than a compliance with, the several rules apply-
ing in equity receivership. Although the general rule was that no claim which
came into existence after the expiration of the period set for filing claims was
provable,2 5 the minority view was that claims which were sufficiently matured
before any order of diatribution was made had to be allowed.a And by com-
puting damages to the date of the hearing, the court granted the lessor com-
pensation for a period of six months after re-entry and repossession of the
properties, events which in some jurisdictions terminate all liability on the
lease.
27
While the decision may make the best of a very ambiguous statute in con-
nection with the question of provability, it leaves unsettled the status of the
balance of the lessor's claim. Both in receihership and bankruptcy the un-
provable portion of the lessor's claim was not discharged by the litigation.p
In case of liquidation this fact was of little import since the termination of
the proceeding left the lessee a corporate shell. But in reorganization one
encountered the rule of the Boyd case.29 that an unsecured creditor, even
though his claim was barred by technical rules of provability, must be granted
participation in any plan which grants participation to stockholders. The
relevance of this rule to proceedings under Section 77 is a controversial ques-
tion. It seems fairly clear that the doctrine applied in favor of a lessor who
21. Id., at 13-330.
22. H. R. REP. No. 1283, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (1935); SF-;. REP. No. 1336, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess., Calendar No. 1388 (1935).
23. 79 Cong. Rec. 13293, 13764 (1935).
24. Cf. Friendly, Amendment of the Railroad Reorganization Ac (1936) 36 Cor-
L. REv. 27, 50-52.
25. See note 6, supra.
26. Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597 (1918); New York SLc. & Trust Co.
v. Lombard Ind. Co., 73 Fed. 537 (C. C. W. 1). Mo. 18961 ; PTvnnsylvania Steel Co. v.
New York City Ry., 198 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 2d. 1912).
27. See note 9, supra. The Supreme Court has rec utly dtkcidel that tile provability
of a claim under the corresponding provision of § 77B is unaffccted by a re-entry w-hich,
under the operative state law, terminated the leasehold. City Bank Co. v. Irving Trust
Co., 29) U. S. 433 (1937).
28. 42 STar. 354 (192-), 11 U. S. C. § 35 (1934): People v. Metrolrolitan Surety
Co.. 205 N. Y. 135, 98 N. E. 412 (1912) ; ste VA-trtF. Il7axn -c\ (Gilbert's ed. 1937)
§ 533.
29. Northern Pacific Ry. Y. Bloyd. 228 U. S. 4$ (1913).
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had been left with an unprovable claim for rent in an equity receivership.80
Furthermore, if the principle is applicable under Section 77,31 it would seem
to apply in favor of lessors, for they are included within the statutory defini-
tion of creditors.3 2 But the doctrine of the Boyd case was based on the prem-
ise -that granting participation to stockholders without making any provision
for undischarged claims was in effect a fraudulent transfer. Section 77(b)
provides that the term "creditors" shall include all holders of claims of what-
ever character "whether or not such claims would otherwise constitute prov-
able claims under this Act,"33 and Section 77(f) provides that when a plan
of reorganization has been confirmed, the property "shall be free and clear of
all claims of the debtor, its stockholders and creditors," and the debtor "shall
be discharged from its debts and liabilities."3 4 It may thus be argued that
the statute removes the right which the rule created, since there are no longer
any undischarged claims upon which to base the doctrine. On the other hand,
it is arguable that the requirements of Section 77(e), that the reorganization
plan be "fair and equitable" and that it "conform to the requirements of the
law of the land regarding participation of the various classes of stockhold-
ers,"35 are specific directions to apply the equitable principle of the Boyd case.
But in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has recently held that the
doctrine does not apply in favor of lessors under Section 77B,36 where the
pertinent provisions are not dissimilar,3 7 it seems unlikely that it will be held
to apply in favor of lessors in Section 77. Furthermore, it is clear that if the
rule of the Boyd case is held to apply, the decision in this case is practically
meaningless, for lessor's claims will be wiped out only in those rare cases
where stockholders do not participate in the reorganization. 8
Whether or not the rule of the Boyd case applies, any answer to the prob-
lem of provability must depend in large part upon practical considerations.
The lessor railroad whose lease has been rejected and whose property has
been relet at a lower figure is naturally anxious to -have its claim allowed in
full, but several factors militate against this result. In the first place, the
30. Hamer v. New York Rys., 244 U. S. 266 (1917); Howard v. Maxwell Motor
Co., Inc., 269 Fed. 292 (S. D. N. Y. 1920); see Douglas and Frank, supra note .6, at
1022.
31. The rule applied to a sale of corporate assets in bankruptcy proceedings. Kingston
v. American Car and Foundry Co., 55 F. (2d) 132 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932), cerl. den.,
285 U. S. 560 (1932) ; see Douglas and Frank, .pra note 6, at 1013.
32. See note 14, supra.
33. 49 STAT. 913 (1935), 11 U. S. C. § 205 (b) (Supp. 1936).
34. 49 STAT. 920 (1935), 11 U. S. C. § 205 (f) (Supp. 1936).
35. 49 STAT. 918 (1935), as amended 49 STAT. 1969, 11 U. S. C. §205 (e) (1)
(Supp. 1936).
36. Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 445 (1937).
37. 48 STAT. 919, 11 U. S. C. § 207 (f) (1934).
38. The New Haven reorganization may be such a case. See (1937) 145 CO1,MMERCIAL
AND FINANCIAL CHRONICLE 1746.
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characteristic expansion of railroad systems during periods of business pros-
perity, the desire to monopolize transportation in a given region,30 and owner-
ship of the leased line by the promotors of the system have often
produced exorbitant rentals for extremely long terms.40 Consequently, when
the road is placed in the reorganization court, lessors have extremely large
claims for damages, the full allowance of which would seriously dilute the
participation of other creditors whose rights rest upon a more solid founda-
tion. Secondly, the fact that there is no unrestricted market for railroad
properties from which to deduce estimates of rental values makes an accurate
ascertainment of the amount of damage practically impossible. Finally, while
in the reorganization of many other types of business the lessor often suffers
loss through the vacating of the property, this possibility is precluded in rail-
road reorganizations because the public interest demands the operation of all
railroads until the Interstate Commerce Commission has decreed otherwise, u
and because the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the entire system will
usually compel the lessee to re-lease the lessor's line.42 The arguments for
full allowance of the lessor's claim are also cogent. There is usually no con-
necting line other than the lessee's to which the lessor may re-lease; and as
the latter has inevitably allowed its operating organization to disintegrate in
reliance upon a long term lease, the parent organization has a distinct advan-
tage in bargaining for new rentals43 which might well be counterbalanced by
allowing claims for future rent. Moreover, the possibility that a professional
trouble maker might buy up lessor's claims, an evil with which corporate
reorganizations have often been plagued, 44 seems remote in view of the size
of the claims involved and the close association of all the parties in an inte-
grated railroad system. 41 In the last analysis, these considerations seem fairly
evenly balanced, and therefore the best solution appears to be judicial pro-
nouncement of, and adherence to, a definite rule.
39. The New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. furnished a notable example dur-
ing the years 1903-1913. Investigation of New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 220 I. C. C.
505, 506-510 (1937) ; RiPLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 466-473.
40. Railroad leases are generally of extremely long duration. See RIPLEY. op. cit.
supra note 3, at 419.
41. 41 STAT. 477 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 1 (18) (1934) ; cf. Bankruptcy Act § 77 (c)
6, 49 STAT. 915 (1935), 11 U. S. C. § 205 (Supp. 1936).
42. Though reorganization may result in the dropping of unproductive subsidiary
lines, the more usual effect is actually to increase the mileage. See Ct.Tto-D AND
POWELL, op. cit. supra note 3, at 264.
43. Ibid.
44. This was particularly a feature of the epidemic of chain-store bankruptcies. See
Jacobson, Landlord's Claims under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (1936) 45 YAi
L. J. 422, 433.
45. The original draft of the 1935 amendment to Section 77 contained a specific
provision for future rent claims which had been assigned. But this provision was
stricken from the final bill. See notes 19 and 20, supra.
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